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In this paper we explore the issue of academic incubators performances. We 
first discuss how and why universities entered the business arena to extract value 
from the knowledge they were creating. We argue that Universities followed two 
different strategies: a simple goal versus a mixed goals strategy. This dichotomy has 
made the issue of measuring performances a tricky one.  
As far as performances in value extraction is concerned, huge differences 
exist. We suggest that available input resources are not a full account for explaining 
such differences. We argue that real commitment, specialization of resources and 
ability to modify and innovate internal processes can explainthese differences. We 





In his passionate and moving introductory speech at University of Stanford in 
2006, Steve Jobs ironically noticed that he had never been so close to a University 
before. His relationship with academia is well known: he dropped the college, 
attended only courses was really interested in and was mainly engaged in getting the 
right food for his mind. There is no evidence of useful contacts Jobs made when he 
was attending courses. This does not mean he wasted his time. For instance, he 
admitted that his knowledge of typewriting and keyboard characters was 
instrumental to the launch of the first Macintosh in 1984. However, as he made it 
clear in the speech, that knowledge became useful only afterwards, as he connected 
the dots. 
One might conclude that Jobs turned out to be an out of ordinary entrepreneur 
despite his academic experience or, differently said, thanks to his shallow contact 
with the academy. His “out of the box” personality allowed him to learn fascinating 
things, with little concern on their possible future use and value. Should had Jobs 
behaved as a traditional university student, he would have not stumbled in 
knowledge that turned out to be relevant in the computer industry. Jobs attended 
academia back in the late ‘70’s. At that time, Universities were fully concerned with 
doing their “business as usual” as well as possible. None of them, to my knowledge, 
had established any entrepreneurial course1. Also, there were no entrepreneurial 
labs or incubators that assisted students willing to set an entrepreneurial career. 
Now, suppose Jobs attended the University today. He would be offered a vast array 																																																								
1 An exception was Schumpeter that in 1948 established at Harvard the “Center for Research and 
Entrepreneurial History” and taught entrepreneurship to veterans of world war II (M. Landoni, personal 
communication) 
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of entrepreneurial and technological courses, as well incentives and prizes for new 
innovative ideas, space in an incubator to work with his team, as well as service and 
support for launching his venture. Nobody can predict whether in this scenario Jobs 
would have developed what he did, of course. However, without being too 
pessimistic, chances are that not any University would have been in the position to 
attract, retain and accompany such a talented entrepreneur. Most likely, several (if 
not all) Universities would have lost the opportunity to leverage the knowledge of a 
brilliant person. 
Universities represent a huge repository of knowledge, both old and new. 
From an institutional viewpoint, Universities are both required to diffuse existing 
knowledge and to pass it to their surrounding communities, as well as to produce 
new knowledge in different fields. New knowledge represents a possible source of 
value, as in the case of new products and processes that leverage new discoveries. 
As far as value creation and extraction is concerned, up untill the mid ‘70’s there was 
a clear distinction between Universities, from one hand, and companies, from 
another. Universities were responsible to do on-the-edge research that eventually 
resulted in scientific breakthroughs. Companies – both newly born and existing ones 
– were responsible to turn these breakthroughs in technological and technical viable 
new products.  
Over the recent years, this distinction has blurred and Universities have 
entered the business scene in order to extract value from new knowledge.  Such 
extraction occurs mainly in two ways. From one side, Universities may transfer 
knowledge to existing companies and get fresh financial resources. This is for 
instance the case of patents, that can be licensed or reassigned.  From another side, 
Universities might encourage new companies’ creation, get minority equity and then 
extract value by selling it. 
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In this new scenario, the winning motto is “Universities have to enter the 
business arena” and develop a third mission (Gulbrandsen and Slipersoeter, 2007). 
Supporters of this view argue that Universities cannot be detached from the “real 
world”. Universities offering entrepreneurs training coursed, both in their official and 
commercial programs, are getting widespread consensus. Universities setting up 
entrepreneurial labs and participating to incubators get positive feedback from their 
environment and can enhance their reputation. Skeptics of Universities entering the 
business arena argue that this consensus is to a large extent an outcome of 
converging and self-sustainable beliefs. In this view, at best, Universities aim at 
becoming entrepreneurial for institutional and mimetic reasons (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Skeptics warn Universities of the risk of 
overlooking their mission to do (badly) a new job. To skeptics, Universities should 
limit themselves to their “original” mission and do it as good as possible, for 
academic and institutional regulation are at odds with extraction of value in the 
market (Teece 1986, Sullivan 1998). This skepticism highly contrast with a 
widespread diffusion of initiatives intended to allow universities not only to create but 
also to extract value. A large numbers of Universities offers not only entrepreneurial 
programs but also direct assistance to students and teams willing to exploit their 
intellectual capital. 
A possible way to disentangle from  the pro’s versus con’s dilemma and to 
escape from a binary approach (Universities should/should not) is to explore under 
which conditions is beneficial to directly engage in value extraction activities. The 
thesis of this paper is that not any University is in the position of doing a good job in 
extracting value from new knowledge, be it patents and new companies. Put it 
differently, we argue that it is time to investigate what the real outcome of such 
involvement is, consider costs and benefits of such programs and ask whether they 
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make sense from a resource perspective for a specific actor. The argument is that 
actual results in terms of value extraction do vary significantly among Universities. 
This is particularly true at international level, where differences in terms of 
institutional framework, rules and legislation might explain such an high variance. 
However, we suspect that huge differences do exist also at local level: some (a 
few?) Universities have achieved very good results, others (the vast majority?) have 
had bad performances and a small number are getting average results. 
In this paper, we take as a test-bed the academic Italian setting, that we 
consider homogeneous from an institutional point of view2. Our aim is to control for 
the real outcome in terms of value extraction among the seventy-seven different 
Universities that have been active in Italy in the last fifteen years3. We maintain that 
available input resources, that can be considered as a pre-requisite for extracting 
value from knowledge, are only a partial reason for explaining such differences. 
Clear enough, Universities with several Departments spanning several scientific and 
technological domains, with hundreds of researchers and doctoral programs, are 
better equipped to extract value from knowledge than small, focused Universities. 
Available inputs – as available research on innovative companies clearly 
demonstrates (Chesbrough, 2003) - are not the only determinant of possible 
outcome,  however. The same argument holds true for public organizations and 
																																																								
2 Thus, despite differences in norms and rules at local level. For instance, there might be differences 
from a human resource management perspective (e.g. full time chance for academic entrepreneurs). 
3 We set year 2000 as the threshold for several reasons: first, because in that year major Universities 
set up their first incubators; second, because it took several years to institutionalize these incubators, 
giving a lenghty approval process. Third, because Universities that were launched afterwards are to a 
large extent on-line Universities.  
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Universities, where some can do better than others having the same inputs, or 
achieve comparable results with less available resources. 
We argue that three main variables might explain these differences. First 
variable is commitment, that is the willingness of an institution to enter a program of 
value extraction from internal knowledge4. Here we partition between a real 
commitment and a ceremonial commitment. Real commitment means a University 
has started the program of value extraction after a careful scrutiny of external threats 
and opportunities as well of internal strengths and weaknesses; has defined a 
several years program with specific targets to be reached; set up a specialized unit 
with a due organizational autonomy and an proper budget; devised an internal 
process to consider on a recurring basis pro’s and con’s. Ceremonial commitment 
means that a University has entered a program of value extraction largely as a result 
of environmental pressure to conform to an expected (socially welcomed) behavior. 
As a consequence, it has not carried out a rigorous process of scrutiny and has 
taken further actions only for getting external consensus and approval. 
Second variable is the specialization of resources assigned to the program of 
value extraction. Specialization of resources has two main features. First feature is 
the amount of resources temporarily or permanently assigned to the program. 
Clearly, the more is not necessarily the better, but “reasonably adequate” resources 
are a necessary, not sufficient, condition to extract value from internal knowledge. 
Second feature is the quality of resources. By quality of resources we mean both the 
level of human capital made available to the program and the level of social capital 
																																																								
4 Internal knowledge may sound like an inappropriate definition in an era of recurring recombination 
between internal and external knowledge (Tanya and Pfeffer, 2003; Grimpe and Kaise, 2010). The 
concept is here meant to focus on inside (-out) processes, that is on knowledge that was mainly 
produced by internal members. 
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attached to it. For instance, suppose that University A and B have launched a similar 
program for extracting value from knowledge and assigned comparable resources. 
However, University A office is mainly formed by freshman, young personnel with no 
experience in any industry and a superficial knowledge – say – of the venture capital 
market. On the other hand, University B has chosen to complement internal, young 
and enthusiast personnel with well known past executives with a dense network of 
connection in several industries. Most likely, University A and B will achieve different 
results, other things being equal. 
Third variable is the ability to modify and innovate internal processes to 
effectively extract value from internal knowledge. Universities are subject to a 
complex web of norms and regulations that can eventually result in poor action. For 
example, and because of these layered, often not coherent web of norms some 
Universities prohibit full time Professors to be actively involved in start-ups and spin-
offs. Others do give permission, provided that Professors change their status from 
full time to part time. Others Universities allow Professors to keep their full time 
status if the University is a shareholder of the new company. These differences are 
largely due to a different interpretation of a common institutional framework, that can 
get modified by specific decisions of the Board of Directors of the University. These 
changes are just an example. Others include Universities setting up specific, new 
organizations to support their program for extracting value from knowledge, such as 
foundations, joint-ventures with other institutions and the like. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the first paragraph we summarize main 
events and determinants that led Universities enter the business scene; in the 
second paragraph depicts two strategies, simple and mixed goals, adopted to enter 
the "business game"; in the third paragraph based on available evidence, we discuss 
existing research concerning outcome; in the fourth we propose a possible 
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framework useful for measuring incubators performances; in the fifth we examine the 
Italian case and provide support to our assumptions. We then draw conclusions and 
offer insights for future research. 
Our investigation is largely conceptual, speculative and based on existing, 
mostly anecdotal evidence. Our contribution to the field is twofold. First, we propose 
a general framework that can be easily tested through usual statistical methods, 
once proper data are made available. Second, we offer a road-map to Universities to 
reconsider their action and their outcome in the field. More generally, we argue that 
value extraction programs are not “a bad or a good thing” in itself but ought be 
considered from a rigorous perspective. We argue that not every University can play 
the value extraction game for structural and organizational conditions. Both 
conditions are relevant and can make a difference: dwarfs can become good players 
in this game, giants may find themselves unappropriate. 
 
1. How and why Universities entered the scene 
 
One might say that Universities, both in scientific fields and humanities,  have 
always been deeply involved in creating value. As final stage in the education 
system, Universities have nurtured highly skilled human capital. Part of this human 
capital has entered the entrepreneurial career thanks to the previous knowledge 
provided by the academic system (Greve and Salaff, 2003). One may also say – 
contrary to Steve Jobs’ experience -- that Universities have always been a perfect 
spot to encourage entrepreneurial adventures. Universities do research on the edge 
of several scientific domains. This research may prompt relevant discoveries that in 
turn can favour new technological and technical innovations. Universities are also 
rich of social capital, because researchers have always been open to contact their 
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peers to exchange knowledge and discuss their discoveries. Back in the eighteen 
and nineteen centuries such contacts turn out to be crucial for young-to-be 
entrepreneurs. For instance, the Dean of Politecnico in Milan encouraged a young 
Giovanni Battista Pirelli to visit his colleague in 1872 to discuss possible application 
of a new process of making rubber. That visit sparked one of the most relevant 
manufacturing initiative in the tyre industries and made Pirelli one of the main 
competitors in a very competitive – today oligopolistic – market (Polese, 2004 and 
2006). 
Universities decided to directly enter the business arena to extract value from 
new knowledge only in recent years. There is no one date that set this entry in every 
country. Universities in North America and specifically in United States were 
probably the first to take clear steps in this direction. Universities in Europe, despite 
the fact (or probably because) they were opened centuries before, were more 
reluctant do make this decision. In the United States the institutional shift towards 
business occurred smoothly. The structure of the University system allowed a strict 
cooperation with the business environment. Several (private) Universities received 
huge grants and paved the way for turning rural areas in the most advanced 
worldwide high tech district, as in the case of Stanford University. Grants and 
donations from past scholars as well as continuous research cooperation programs 
between Universities and companies do  reveal a deep interdependency that is 
rooted in history. The same does not hold true in other countries, namely in Europe, 
where a rigid division of labour – companies doing business and universities doing 
research, each on its own side – has reigned for centuries.   
In addition to huge cultural differences, we may also factor in differences in 
the overall legislation and in norms regulating the academic system across Ocean. 
Consider for instance enforcement of intellectual capital and dual ladder career. Both 
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are relevant in making the context good for business inside the academia. 
Enforcement of intellectual capital provides researchers adequate incentive to both 
institutions and researchers, as patents’ outcome are split between the two. Dual 
ladder career offers talented individual the possibility of shifting between business 
and university thank to a flexible market labour. Consider, on the other hand, Europe 
and Italy as a point in case. Legislation on patents has been modified and 
reinterpreted many times in the last decade, and incentives for researchers are still 
unclear; on the other hand, mobility between business and university is an 
impossible mission. 
Nurturing entrepreneurship was natural and part of the job in the United 
States. In Europe the situation was quite different: as for Italy, one might think of the 
Pirelli case as an exception. Not surprisingly, studies on entrepreneurship report that 
in Italy entrepreneurs with an academic degree have always been a small minority 
(Curci and Micozzi 2004). To simplify, we might say that entrepreneurship was 
interwoven with the academic life in U.S., but occurred mostly outside Universities in 
most European countries. 
However, it took decades also for Universities in U.S. to make the decision to 
enter the business arena. Simply put, this means Universities were ready to take 
some financial and economic risk in search for potential return. Patents were the first 
setting to play this game. Universities and public research centers entered the patent 
business, and have become a significant source of potential patents. Since the 
approval of the Bayh Dole Act (1980), University Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) 
have significantly increased their presence in technology markets. The number of 
patents filed by university researchers has surged since then, as well as licensing 
agreements between universities and corporations (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008). As 
well as spin-offs and start-ups is concerned, Universities in United States rarely 
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played directly the game and not surprisingly most famous incubators, as in the San 
Francisco Area, have been funded by individuals and private companies (XY 
Combinators; 500+; etc.).This is not to say that U.S. Universities were indifferent 
towards new companies in the high tech. They rather “left to the market” initial 
decision of nurturing and financing new ideas. They also assigned the decision to 
buy shares of new companies to their specialized investment units, as well as to 
funds they were participating to. Their surrounding milieu was more than enough to 
do the job of assisting new companies’ creation. As one Professor at Mechanical 
Engineer at Stanford states “by just walking outside the campus you can build the 
incubator that better suits your needs”. 
Europe was in different conditions. It is almost impossible to consider Europe 
as a unitary entity (also) from this perspective. Simply put, we might identify 
countries and regions where Universities were open to business (United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Holland, etc.) and others that despite their tradition in entrepreneurship 
were quite reluctant. Italy is a case in point. Not only it is home of micro and small 
entrepreneurship, as more than 90% of the working population is occupied in 
companies with less than 9 employees. Entrepreneurships is regarded as a value in 
itself, as it crosses different social classes and has offered to many the opportunity of 
a better economic life (Paci, 1972). Despite this, Universities have remained 
suspicious and reluctant to enter the business arena. Up untill the end of years 2000, 
some of them were offering administrative and bureaucratic assistance to 
researchers (quite rarely students) willing to patent their inventions. However, they 
did not provide services as far value extraction from patents is concerned. For the 
same token, they did not have teaching programs specifically targeting 
entrepreneurship, nor they provided ad hoc services for setting up new companies. 
Business was walking his side and universities theirs. 
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These conditions started to change around years at the turn of the century, for 
several reasons: 
Ø the booming of Internet opened up unforeseen opportunities in different fields. 
New, totally different business models emerged. Dwarfs that started small soon 
emerged as gigantic entities. Quite often, these new companies were started by 
young people that leveraged their background and what had learned at school 
(e.g. Larry Page and Sergey Brin); 
Ø Universities soon realized they were at the cross-road of new knowledge that 
could have been applied to specific domains. To some of them, pooling the 
resources needed to start a company was an easy game, due to the presence of 
a blooming venture capital industry; 
Ø Highly skilled professionals like researchers and professors got increasingly 
attracted by a professional career and became available to assist their students 
in their entrepreneurial adventures; 
Ø Universities experienced (especially in Europe) an increased financial pressure, 
as their environment was less munificent. Finding new ways for funding 
Universities became part of the agenda and helped loosen a legislation that was 
in several countries very restrictive. 
 
2. Universities entering the business arena and the outcome puzzle 
 
Companies competing in the market arena are “easy” to measure. Different 
metrics exist, be it the profit (for the financial communities and the shareholders), the 
created value (for customers) or the satisfaction and payback (for suppliers). Like it 
or not, market rules set it clear that a company exists up to the point it produces 
more than it absorbs. Universities are a different story. First of all, most of them are 
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public and non profit	oriented. Their outcome is judged according to different and 
variable measures. Different stakeholders of the same University may have different 
opinions and preferences on what the preferred outcome ought to be, so that the 
final evaluation is often a compromise. Second, measures to measure Universities 
performances do pose several trade-offs. One of the most celebrated one, at least in 
Europe, is between quantity and quality (enrolled students; graduated students; 
published papers, and so on…). 
When it came to define what the outcome of entering the business game (as I 
called it) had to be, my assumption is that the overall population was somehow split 
in two. A first part of the population, probably including a good number of North 
European Universities, directly entered the business game for specific business 
reasons. This is not of course to say that these Universities wanted to distribute 
profits: they simply wanted to directly extract value from business and pass it to their 
internal institutional activities. Extracting, not only creating value was therefore the 
mission assigned to new specialized units. Having clearly defined what the mission 
was allowed them to adjust their decisions along the way. For instance, some 
Universities realized that the internal staff assigned to the new task was largely 
unprepared to do the job. The logic and background of an administrative, although 
highly skilled, clerk were at odds with what was needed to – say – find a customer 
for a patent, start a negotiation, finalize the deal. The same had happened in U.S. 
before. University of California at Berkeley provides  anedoctical support: their 
internal units whose mission was to extract value from patents performed poorly for 
years until they recruited a seasoned manager who was in a short time able to 
achieve very satisfactory results5. 
																																																								
5 Personal communication, TTO Stanford University 
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A second part of the population entered the business game with mixed and 
intertwined goals. By large, most of them wanted to adhere to a “social”, increasingly 
popular request: Universities could no longer behave as ivory towers. Rather, they 
were requested to address social and economic challenges, helping their country to 
extract value from existing knowledge. Social pressure was also coming from internal 
members as researchers and professors, who wanted to keep their dual position and 
were reluctant to follow a restrictive regulation. Besides these common pressures, 
others Universities clearly perceived that entering the business game was a clever 
strategy to differentiate themselves from other competitors. Being closed to the 
business environmente and nurturing inside entrepreneurship allowed for enhancing 
the University reputation both in the targeted population of students and in specific 
industries. Enhanced reputation and stronger ties provided in turn other positive side 
effects both for the institution (research projects; consortia; etc.) and for its members 
(assignments; jobs and the like). 
These two different strategies (simple goal vs mixed goals) resulted in two 
different approaches. The simple goal strategy served to search the most 
appropriate available organizational solutions or to set a new organizational solution. 
At the same time, the simple goal strategy allowed for a process approach: rather 
than discussing alternatives in an abstract way, it permitted to focus on costs and 
benefits of past actions as well as on needed changes. I have no direct evidence, but 
I suspect that the simple goal strategy avoided possible misunderstandings with 
stakeholders. For example, it helped to distinguish between for profits activities (e.g. 
the university participating to a fund for new companies) and educational activities 
(e.g. an internal lab to develop business games). 
Universities following mixed goals strategy probably enjoyed more degrees of 
freedom at the beginning, as they were able to switch among different alternatives 
	 16	
and to present most convenient measures. However, I suspect that mixed goals 
strategy was effective up until the overall environment remained munificent. Costs of 
entering the business arena remained for years sunk, and benefits largely not 
defined.  
  
3. Performance measures 
 
The simple goal strategy and the mixed goal strategy are probably the two 
extreme poles as far as value extraction is concerned. In reality it would be difficult to 
find a “pure”, fully representative mode in both case for at least two reasons. First 
reason is that University’s shareholders and stakeholders may differ, forcing 
dominant coalitions to  “compromise” and to find a satisfactory equilibrium. Second 
reason is that also regulated environments can change, thus forcing dominant 
coalitions to not pledge fully measurable results. 
By using Thompson (1967) seminal work, we can  possibly frame how 
Universities decided on value extraction. Two are the relevant variables for 
Thompson: the chain means/ends (clear versus unclear) and the nature (crystallized 
vs uncertain) of organizational preferences. Measuring both is not an easy task.  
Placing the two strategies into Thompson’s scheme is possible as far as 
preferences is concerned: simple strategies correspond more to crystallized 
preferences whereas mixed strategies correspond more to uncertain preferences. 
Assessing whether the chain means-ends was clear or unclear requires a 
longitudinal approach, but a traceable internal process where real outcome were 
discussed is necessary, yet not sufficient, condition. We can therefore assume that 
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simple strategies called for (comparatively) simple measures. Mixed strategies called 
for several, possibly contradictory measures6.  
The issue of how to measure Universities involvment into the business arena 
is still unsolved. Not surpisingly, input measures are being used to seize output 
measures, at least from a business perspective. Patents are a well known case in 
point. Universities count (not measure!) how many patents they file every year. From 
this perspective, it follows than the more the better. However, from a business and 
economic perspective it is not the rough number that matters, but how much value 
patents can carry both indirectly and directly. Indirect value occurs when patents 
protect products and processes. Patents allow for temporary monopolies and extra-
profits that can offset risks and costs of patenting. The more is not necessarily the 
better: patent can be of poor quality (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004), bear costs 
for annuities and renewals (Granstrand, 1999) and provide little economic benefits. 
Revenues from technology transfer are a much more reliable measure. 
Universities  develop internally research than can be fruitfully passed to companies. 
Universities are not in the position of economically leverage such knowledge, for the 
lack of complementary reasons or more often because commercial and market 
exploitation is risky. Rather than keeping this knowledge into a drawer, Universities 
can “sell” or “licence” this knowledge. In turn, Universities receive economic 
resources that can be re-transferred to the internal research.  
Measures of incubators abound. Probably the most known measures are 
those grouped in the University Business Incubator Index (UBI). This index ranks 
incubators, defined as an entity affiliated to a University, whose object is to facilitate 
entrepreneurship, with quality control of intakings and regular exit of ventured firms. 																																																								
6 En passant, too many and contradictory measures tend to be close to no measure at all. 	
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UBI ranks incubators according to three performance categories (value for the 
ecosystem, value for client, attractiveness), seven performance sub-categories  
(economy enhancement , talent retention, competence development,  access to 
funds,  network enhancement, incubator offer, post incubation performance) and 
more than sixty keys performance indicators. As in any ranking one might be 
skeptical of the assigned weight, or argue that some indicators are disputable, some 
dubious (# of contacts) and some contradictory (profitability may be at odds with # of 
staff). 
A large number of key indicators seem to suggest that as far as incubators is 
concerned Universities can enjoy high degrees of freedom in evaluating their 
outcome. It is true that incubating new firms is a multifaceted task with various 
possible (positive) side effects. Time issue is also critical: incubating new firm is a 
lengthy and sometimes painful process. It might take several years. External 
conditions may change abruptly and new technologies can make promising projects 
useless.  However, we argue that value extraction parallels Occam’s razor. 
Universities that evaluate their efforts in incubating new firms according to a value 
extraction criterion are better off than Universities picking (ex-post) the combination 
of goals that better suits their actual performances. 
 
4. A possible framework 
 
Setting value extraction as an overarching goal makes things easier. Not 
paradoxically, this goal-setting is coherent with the institutional mission of diffusing 
knowledge. To a large extent, Universities are not profitable entities. Additional value 
they can extract from patents, transfer of technology and new firms can be returned 
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to research and education. Because of decreasing funding, especially in Western 
Europe, Universities ought to be highly concerned with value extraction. 
The real issue becomes what makes value extraction possible. Why some 
Universities extract considerable value and others get only modest results? One 
might frame the problem by saying that Universities have little control over their 
environment. Munificent environments will make value extraction easy to achieve; 
poor environments will make the same mission impossible. Universities are highly 
dependent on their environment, as any organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
They are subject to a multilayered regulation. Regulations do vary considerably 
among countries. One might conclude that incubators are highly country specific. 
However, recent reports (BIBLIO) clarify that there is no “average” (national) 
performance. In a specific country, some incubators perform well whereas others 
perform poorly, a pretty evident conclusion if one admits that organizations are not a 
byproduct of the environment they live in. 
Another possible explanation is the amount of resources Universities can 
count on. Large Universities with several Departments, a large number of 
researchers and a wide focus should outcompete small Universities with a few 
departments, a modest number of researchers and a narrow focus. Simply stated, 
the higher the input the (more than proportionally) higher the output. 
 This explanation is of little help and possibly misleading, however. Resources 
and size matters, of course, but they are only a poor proxy of what the possible 
outcome can be. To support this statement, I have compared two European 
Universities as far as input and output measures is concerned. The comparison is 
highly incomplete, but it is illustrative of the argument. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
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To make sense of the possible differences as far as value extraction is 
concerned, I suggest a simple framework with three main variables 
First variable is commitment, an hallmark of organization theory (Kessler, 
2012). Here I distinguish between real and ceremonial commitment. Real 
commitment means that value extraction has a relevant place in the agenda of the 
dominant coalition. Dominant coalition perceives value extraction as a positive 
outcome and as a result that is possible, no matter the external constraints. Several 
variables at different level may be used to control if a University is really committed 
to extract value. For instance, if the dominant coalition devotes a considerable 
amount of time and attention to this issue, we may infer that commitment is real. For 
the same token, if value extraction brings along clear goal-setting and “measurable” 
incentives, we may conclude that commitment play a key role. Cerimonial 
commitment means that the University and its dominant coalition do not really 
believe value extraction is a critical component. The dominant coalition has other 
priorities and value extraction is low in the agenda. However, to comply with 
dominant beliefs or to please important stakeholders, a dominant coalition can 
embrace value extraction. Under these conditions, commitment becomes largely 
ceremonial and ritualistic: the more value extraction is extolled and celebrated, the 
less is supported. Distinction between real and ceremonial commitment can be 
articulated along Argyris and Schon (1974) seminal contribution on theories of action. 
They distinguish between theories-in-use and espoused theories. Theories in use 
govern actual behaviour and tend to be tacit structures. Espoused theories are words 
we use to convey what an organization would like others to think it does. 
Second variable is specialization and autonomy of resources. Specialization 
of resources is to some extent dependent upon commitment. Clearly, Universities 
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that do not want to commit to extracting value tend not to specialize resources to this 
end. The other way around does not necessarily hold true. In my view, specialization 
of resources means more than assigning people to the complex task of extracting 
value. If an organization commits to this, long term goal, a careful scrutiny of what is 
needed is a first, necessary step. Dealing with the business environment is not the 
same that dealing with education: language, procedures, skills and competences do 
differ significantly. Modifying role and tasks of internal personnel can be an option. 
The other option is to hire specific resources coming from business. One way or 
another, the issue of compatibility may arise. A possible way out is to set up a dual 
organization or to promote to some extent ambidexterity (O’Really and Tushmann, 
2004). However, I suspect that business and education don’t have much in common. 
For sure, significant degrees of autonomy are needed if an internal unit has the 
mission of extracting value. 
Third variable is is the ability to modify and innovate internal processes to 
effectively extract value from internal knowledge. Universities are to a large extent 
bureaucratic organizations, where rule following is king. Following rules stabilizes the 
environment, reduces uncertainty and economizes on decision-making. However, 
following rules bears an high price when flexibility is needed and when decisions 
need to be made quickly. Internal, lengthy procedures might become incompatible 
with urgent needs of customers, suppliers and partners.  The cost of organizing 
cooperative action may simply become unbearable. To solve the contradiction, 
Universities have to option. First option is to modify internal processes, for example 
by approving rules and norms tailored to business needs. Most likely, these rules 
and norms are more effective if decision-makers can “interpret” them and adapt to 
the real issues they are facing. Second option is to innovate internal processes. The 
distinction between modifying and innovating internal processes might seem very 
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subtle. Innovating internal processes simply means that the dominant coalition takes 
proper institutional action. For instance, it might set up an autonomous unit, set-up 
an holding company to coordinate its activities and even outsource (partially or 
totally) to an external entity. 
 
5. The Italian case 
 
 The University system in Italy has skyrocketed in the last decades. At the 
beginning of the ‘60’s there were slightly more than 300 thousands students; 718 
thousands in 1970, one million in the 80’s, 1 million six thousand in the ‘90’s and 
1,78 milion in 2010 (Miur, 2011). As a result of increasing demand the supply has 
changed considerably. In the ‘80’s there were 51 Universities. In 2010 there were 92 
Universities, including six Special Schools and eleven on-line Universities; 5.835 
different programs (undergraduate and graduate), 171.066 different courses, 61.922 
teachers and researchers; 59.912 technicians and administratives. In twenty year, 
the system has doubled in size  
 
  (Insert Table 2 here) 
 
A few universities concentrate the student population: approximately 40% are 
enrolled in the 10 largest state universities. The  student population in the 20 
smallest universities, of which 17 are non-state institutions, is only 18,753 (Turri, 
2014). The University system is mainly public, with only a few private Universities, i.e. 
Bocconi, founded in 1902 by initiative of Ferdinando Bocconi to honor the memory of 
his son who died in war and Luiss, established in Rome by a group of entrepreneurs 
in 1974. 
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Since year 2000 public funding has decreased considerably in relation to the 
number of students. Data on the government funding mechanism operating since 
1994 reveal a steady decline, that was partly compensated with revenues from 
external sources – mainly student tuition fees, the supply of services and income 
from research grants and contracts (Turri 2011).  
 
  (Insert Table 3 here) 
 
The University system is heavily regulated through a stratified, not always 
coherent cluster of norms: for example, in 2001, 350 different laws passed in the 
previous seventy years were grouped and made coherent under a common umbrella.  
In 2010 Law 240 introduced important innovations with two major implications. First 
implication was the strengthening of the university executive embodied by the rector, 
a reduction in the influence of collegial bodies, enhancement of the role of 
departments and high regard for the university as a corporate actor.  Second 
implication was reinforcement of authority and functions of state bodies and 
restricted university autonomy. Recruitment and academics’ careers within 
universities were also regulated by a national competitive exam. External evaluation 
procedures were strengthened, particular emphasis was placed on ex ante 
evaluation and there were further restrictions on setting up degree courses in relation 
to minimum requisites (number of academics, their particular discipline and number 
of seats in lecture halls). This was true re-centralisation, since it demolished the 
universities’ freedom to recruit new staff and set up degree courses, which were two 
of the pillars that had served to introduce greater university autonomy in the 1990s. 
In Italy, academic incubators date back to the end of ‘90s. The process was to 
a large extent bottom-up. Professors and researchs acted as evangelists in  their 
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institutions. They offered conceptual reasons to their dominant coalition to set up 
incubators and more generally to enter the business arena; they also offered 
empirical support and patiently built consensus around the idea. A few examples of 
public funded incubators in Italy date back to the Eighties on the wave of an 
increasing awareness shared in Europe about entrepreneurship. However, these 
incubators supported entrepreneurs mainly in manufacturing and in backward 
regions. Only at the turn of the century universities became involved in the 
establishment of academic incubators. Today they are mainly devoted to transfer 
academic knowledge to new, innovative start-up (Auricchio et al., 2014).  
Today, academic incubators represent a significant proportion of active 
incubators, be it private or public. Auricchio and colleagues (2013), based on a 2012 
survey, estimate that in Italy  there are 61 active incubators, mostly in the North. 36 
of them public. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
I have run a web search to double-check this basic information. My 
starting point was PNI website. PNI is the association that gathers all 
Universities incubators and Universities promoting business plan competition. 
There are currently 36 members of this association. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Be a member of PNI should mean to be committed to value extraction. 
However, only 22 Universities offer information about what they do. Out of 22 
Universities, 4 are mostly engaged in business plan competitions. 18 report 
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they have an incubator. Seniority of incubators vary: a few were established 
between the end of the ‘90’s and 2002 (e.g. University of Trieste, Alma Laurea 
of Bologna); some between 2003 and 2006 (e.g. Milan), but the vast majority 
has started after 2007 (e.g. Bocconi University). Seniority is not in itself 
revealing: late comers may take advantage of others’ experience and perform 
brilliantly. However, it is likely that some of late comers practice a cerimonial 
commitment. Universities engaged into business incubators since late ‘90s 
exhibit higher commitment and it is likely that their dominant coalition devote 
more time and attention to the practice. 
As far as specialization of resources is concerned, we observe huge 
variation. The sample can be split in three sub samples. First sub sample is 
characterized by a null/low specialization of resources. Value extraction 
activities are exclusively carried out by internal personnel. Not surprisingly, 
most of the duties and services offered are administrative and bureacratic (e.g. 
assistance in filing a patent). Internal personnel get reassigned to new tasks, 
sometimes with a superficial training. No different structure of incentives exist. 
Second sub-sample is characterized by a medium specialization of resources. 
Internal staff is mainly responsible for offering value extraction services, but 
their recruitment does not follow only a simple administrative logic. Internal 
staff is requested to to analyze and select projects, offer bridging services (e.g. 
towards the business community), assist new projects over time. Moderate ad 
hoc incentives can be designed to incentivate internal staff; external 
consultants may complement the team, need it be. Unimitt (University of 
Milan) is representative of this second sub-sample. Third sub-sample is 
characterized by an high specialization of resources. This is mainly the case 
of incubators relying on full-time professionals. Full-time professionals have a 
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different background. They do not come from academia, but rather from 
industry and consultancy. They were mainly active in business development 
or worked on a project basis for new products- processes. Compensation and 
incentives are tailored according to their background, experience and 
responsibility. I3P (Politecnico of Turin) is illustrative of this sub-sample. 
As for the ability to modify and innovate internal processes to effectively 
extract value, Italian incubators are split in two. On one hand – the vast majority – 
there are incubators whose set up and managing did not bring along substantial 
changes or innovations. These incubators were smoothly established within the 
given institutional framework and did not command major shifts. On another hand, a 
few incubators were established within a different context. Funding universities 
searched for the most appropriate organizational solution, be it a foundation, a 
separate entity (e.g. an externally controlled company) or a consortium. This is for 
instance the case of Politecnico of Milan and of University of Bologna. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Asking whether Steve Jobs would have benefitted from the assistance of an 
University incubator was obviously fictitious, but somehow instrumental to frame the 
argument of this paper. We started examining general reasons that prompted 
Universities enter the business arena. Universities entered the business arena for 
several reasons. 
We argued that measuring the outcome of this entry is not an easy job. We 
have suggested to discriminate between simple and mixed strategies. Simple 
strategies imply that Universities try to appropriate some of the value they create.  
Mixed strategies means that Universities try to accomplish multiple goals at the 
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same time. Universities pursuing mixed strategies can accommodate several 
stakeholders’ preferences in the short term, but long term they risk to get stucked. 
Extracting value from knowledge is a serious issue. Universities have evident 
incentives to do so. In most countries they are facing financial constraints and 
substantial definancing. Extracting value might represent an effective way to pursue 
institutional mission.  Value extraction at University level mainly occurs at three 
levels: patents; tecnology transfer and new ventures. Within different time intervals, 
all approximate how much value gets created and directly extracted by Universities. 
Over the recent years, Universities have rushed to promote several initiatives to 
extract value. Set-up of technology transfer offices and of incubators are two 
examples in this respect. Empirical evidence suggests that, controlling for value 
extraction, there is a huge variation. This seems true especially at international level. 
Not surprisingly, input measures in creating value are weakly (negatively?) correlated 
with output measures. At national level significant, but less robust variance seems 
also to exist. 
We have proposed an overarching framework to account for these differences. 
We have assumed that commitment, specialization of resources and ability to modify 
and innovate internal processes might turn out to be extremely relevant.  A 
preliminary exam of the Italian case bears indirect evidence to internally controllable 
variables as main drivers of future outcome in extracting value. If these results would 
be confirmed through a deep analysis at population level, several managerial 
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Population   
-number 2,5 million 0.55 million 




- Departments (Number) 31 100** 
- Professors (Number)  ≈2300 1616 
Students   
-number 58.546 19.166 
-undergraduate 37.465 11.820 
 -graduate 21.081 7.346 
Intellectual Property   
-active patents 97 1000 
-revenues from IP (million) < € 0,3 *** £ 16.6  
Spin-off    
-number 24 68* 
-sales of equity  0 £ 1.7 million* 
*: 2011 
** including Faculties, Schools and other Institutions 
*** estimate 
Source: TTO Cambridge, Unimi 
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Table 2.  
Growth of Italian universities since Italian unification. 
 
YEAR STUDENT POPULATION GRADUATES 
1861 6504 n.a. 
1870 12,069 n.a. 
1880 11,871 n.a. 
1890 18,145 n.a. 
1900 23,033 n.a. 
1910 26,850 n.a. 
1920 53,234 8654 
1930 46,262 8606 
1940 127,058 11,934 
1950 231,412 19,724 
1960 268,181 21,886 
1970 681,731 56,895 
1980 1,047,874 74,118 
1990 1,359,787 90,161 
2000 1,673,960 161,484 
2010 1,780,65 293,022 









Table 3  
Variation in the FFO between 1994-2010. 
 
YEAR FFO IN EUROS FFO 
(CONSTANT PRICES, 
REFERENCE YEAR 







2000 = 100) 
1994 3,547,532,000  72.9  75.5 
1995  3,698,631,000  72.2  73.2 
1996 4,669,686,000  87.7  87.7 
1997 5,065,436,000  93.5  94.3 
1998 5,272,935,000  95.6  96.3 
1999 5,401,576,000  96.5  96.9 
2000 5,743,265,000  100.0  100.0 
2001 6,010,548,000  101.9  101.8 
2002 6,209,630,000  102.8  101.8 
2003 6,268,368,000  101.3  96.7 
2004 6,451,557,000  102.2  95.5 
2005 6,847,913,714  106.7  99.8 
2006 6,952,846,426  106.2  99.6 
2007 7,052,775,587  105.9  100.2 
2008 7,351,455,890  106.9  100.1 
2009 7,274,383,089  105.0  99.6 
2010 6,999,813,087  99.5  94.2 




Active incubators in Italy 
 
 





(average, last 5 
years) 
Piemonte 3 3 15 8 
Lombardia  7 5 16 9 
Trentino Alto A. 2 2 54 24 
Veneto  4 2 12 48 
Friuli Venezia G.  3 2 16 5 
Emilia Romagna  9 5 10 5 
Toscana  10 7 70 17 
Umbria  1 1 30 8 
Marche  2 1 10 21 
Lazio  4 3 39 12 
Abruzzo  3 3 13 2 
Molise  1 1 18 3 
Campania  3 2 14 5 
Puglia  2 2 5 3 
Sicilia  2 2 16 94 
Sardegna  2 2 10 2 
Italia  58 36 16 16 





Members of PNI 
 
3P – Incubatore di Imprese Innovative del Politecnico di Torino  
Politecnico di Milano  
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa 
 Università degli Studi di Udine  
Università degli Studi di Padova 
 Università degli Studi di Trieste  
Università degli Studi di Perugia 
 Università degli Studi di Torino  
Università degli Studi di Milano  
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano  
Università degli Studi di Pisa   
Università degli Studi di Firenze  
Università degli Studi di Verona   
Università LUM – Jean Monnet della Puglia 
 Università della Calabria   
Università del Salento  
Università degli Studi di Sassari 
 Università degli Studi di Palermo  
Università degli Studi di Messina   
Università degli Studi di Foggia   
Università degli Studi di Ferrara   
Università degli Studi di Camerino 
 Università degli Studi di Cagliari   
Università degli Studi di Bari   
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila   
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro 
 Università degli Studi del Molise 
 Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi di Milano 
 Università Ca'Foscari di Venezia   
Università Luiss Carlo Guidi di Roma 
 Almacube – Incubatore dell'Università di Bologna   
Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia 
 Università degli Studi di Macerata   
Consorzio Sapienza Innovazione 
 Università degli Studi  Trentino Sviluppo  
Università degli Studi di Catania 
 
Source: www.pni.org 
